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Commercial Arbitration: Expanding the Judicial Role
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is usually defined as "the voluntary agreement
of . . persons to submit their differences to judges of their
own choice and to bind themselves in advance, to accept the
decision of judges, so chosen, as final and binding."'
A
specialized category of arbitration-commercial arbitration 2-is
widely used by businessmen and their attorneys 3 as a speedy
and relatively inexpensive method of trying and resolving contract disputes before commercial specialists. Modern American
legislatures and courts have increasingly restricted judicial
control over commercial arbitration on the theory that arbitration can be used successfully only where the role of the courts
is strictly limited. Moreover, recent decisions allowing arbitrators to determine threshold questions concerning the legality of
commercial contracts have increased the separation of arbitration from the normal controls of a democratic society. These
trends have helped create a body of institutional law which is
often responsive to narrow institutional interests. As a result,
commercial conduct repugnant to many general societal norms
4
has been encouraged.
This Note will examine the underlying policies of American
commercial arbitration, the scope of judicial review of such arbitration, the problems engendered thereunder, and propose a
method of judicial control which will encourage maximum use
of arbitration by businessmen while eliminating many of the
current problems.
1. F. KELLor, AMERICA ARBITRATION 4 (1948). See Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judical Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q.
519, 521 (1960); Sarpy, Arbitration as a Means of Reducing Court
Congestion, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 182, 184 (1965); Sturges & Reckson,
Common-Law and Statutory Arbitration: Problems Arising From Their
Coexistence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 819, 821 (1962). Compare Carlston,
Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 631
(1952).
2. Commercial arbitration may be defined as the settlement of
disputes involving sales contracts, trade association contracts, building
contracts, etc., by arbitration. See note 1 supra.
3. See S. LAZARUS, J. BRAY, L. CARTER, K. COLLINS, B. GIEDT,
R. HOLTON, P. MATTHEWS & G. WILLARD, RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES
41-43 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES].
4. Kronstein, Arbitration Is Power, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 667, 686-99
(1963).
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II. BUSINESS DESIRES AND PRESENT ARBITRATION LAW
The businessman faced with commercial disputes or the possibility of such disputes has four methods available for resolving them. He may negotiate, capitulate, arbitrate, or litigate.
Each method has advantages depending upon the circumstances
surrounding the dispute, although the last three are probably
never resorted to without some attempt to negotiate.5 The businessman may capitulate when he is sure to lose if he presses
further, or when the amounts or principles involved are insignificant in relation to other factors such as maintenance of goodwill or the cost of pursuing the matter further. 6 However,
those disputes that are not negotiated to a settlement generally will be either arbitrated or litigated. Arbitration will be
used to settle disputes when the factors favoring its use outweigh those favoring litigation. The question then becomes
what factors are considered by the businessman when he makes
the choice between these alternatives.

A. FACTORS FAVORING ARBRATION
The factors influencing a businessman to use arbitration to
resolve disputes include speed,7 economy,8 privacy, maintenance
of goodwill, and the use of experts as arbitrators. Arbitration
is speedier than litigation because currently most court calendars
are extremely crowded. 9 Also, arbitration is more expedient
because of simplified procedures and informality in presentation of evidence. 10 Since the arbitration tribunal is set up to
handle only the specific dispute referred to it, there is no wait5.
6.

RESOLVING BusnwEss DISPUTEs 40.
RESOLVING BusrNss DisPuTEs 37-38.

7. See Schiffer, Arbitrate or Litigate?, 20 Ans. J. 49, 51 (1965);
Note, Predictability of Result in Commercial Arbitration, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 1022, 1022 n.1 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Note, Predictability of
Result]; Note, Judicial Control of the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction: A
Changing Attitude, 58 Nw U.L. REV. 521, 542 (1963) [hereinafter cited

as Note, Judicial Control].
8. See Note, Judicial Control 542; Note, Predictability of Result
1022 n.2.
9. The average time between filing of a case and the final award
is approximately two to three months in arbitration as opposed to
fourteen months in litigation. M. DomKE, COVERciAL ARBITRATION 8
(1965) [hereinafter cited as DoiKE]; RESOLVING BuswnEss DIsPuTES
48-49, 127-33. Arbitration is also fast since there is no appeal as a
matter of course and, therefore, the delay inherent in appeal is absent.
Schiffer, supra note 7, at 51. See also Dworkin, Arbitration: An Obvious
Solution to a Crowded Docket, 29 CLEVE. B. ASS'N J. 167 (1958); Sarpy,
supra note 1, at 182-84.
10. Dow= 8-9.
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ing for courtroom space or officials.11 The use of experts as
arbitrators further accelerates the process, because it eliminates the need for expert witnesses to explain trade practices
to the court. 12 Acceleration of the decision process is beneficial
since evidence will be received before it becomes stale.13 In
addition, business capital will not be tied down for long periods
of time since it is not necessary to set aside capital to satisfy
possible future judgments.'4 A greater chance also exists for recovering a judgment since there is less risk of the loser's
going bankrupt or losing his assets.' 5
Arbitration may also be less expensive than litigation. The
additional time that the businessman and his attorney must spend
in trial proceedings generates greater costs than the time spent
in arbitration.' 6 Also, arbitration proceedings require the print11. See Jalet, supra note 1, at 522-23.
12. American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co.,

144 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1944). See Schiffer, supra note 7, at 51.
Arbitrators are willing to give more weight to trade practices than
courts or juries, and tend to decide cases on the basis of ordinary
standards of commercial fairness. Doiwy 9-10; RESOLVING BusnEss
DISPUTES 51-52. Arbitrators are not boumd by the rules of evidence.
See, e.g., Franz v. Inter-Insurance Exch. of Auto Club, 229 Cal. App. 2d
269, 40 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1964); Springs Cotton Mills v. Buster Boy Suit
Co., 275 App. Div. 196, 88 N.Y.S.2d 295, aff'd, 300 N.Y. 586, 89 N.E.2d
877, (1949); Pirsig, The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act and the
Lincoln Mills Case, 42 MIm. L. REV. 333, 350 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as Pirsig, The Minnesota Act]. They may consider hearsay and other
evidence usually considered incompetent in a court of law. See Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359,
632-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); A.O. Anderson Trading Co. v. Brimberg, 119
Misc. 784, 197 N.Y.S. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1922). Their decisions may be
against the weight of the evidence and need not find any support in
the evidence. See, e.g., Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. Eastern States
Petroleum Corp. of Panama, S.A., 312 F.2d 299, 300 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963); Everett v. Brown, 120 Misc. 349, 198 N.Y.S.
462 (Sup. Ct. 1923). See also Sturges, Arbitration-What Is It?, 35
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031, 1033-34 (1960). They may also draw on their personal knowledge in making the award. See, e.g., American Almond
Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., supra; The Guldborg, 1 F.
Supp. 380, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); Springs Cotton Mills v. Buster Boy Suit
Co., supra.

13. See DorMv
9; Popkin, Practical Problems Confronting the
PracticingLawyer, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 652 (1952).
14. Doivn
9. A speedy decision also allows the businessman to
more intelligently plan for the future since he knows what income to
expect or what amount he will have to pay. Sarpy, supra note 1, at 189.
15. DOmxE 9; Popkin, supra note 13, at 652.
16. See RESOLVING BusINEss DIsPUTEs 49-51; Note, Judicial Review

of Arbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 HAv. L. REV. 681 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial Review]. The time spent in pre-

paring for litigation also detracts from doing business and cultivating

business relations. DomiE 9.
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ing and writing of only a few records'17 whereas a trial may
require substantial documentation. The public also benefits
financially since the costs of arbitration are paid entirely by the
parties.'
These costs are not too burdensome to the businessman because most arbitrators serve without pay.19
Great freedom is afforded by the arbitration agreement, because the parties can determine the place of arbitration as well
as the court of competent jurisdiction, should resort to a court
be necessary, even though there is no contact with the jurisdiction.20 The parties may also choose which law will be applied
to the agreement.2 ' In addition, the agreement can specify procedures to be followed during the proceedings. 22 Moreover, by
selecting the place of arbitration, the parties may obtain privacy in the proceedings, 23 which is often important to a busi24
nessman to protect the reputation of his company or product,
26
25
and continuing useful business relationships.
trade secrets,
17. See Pirsig, The Minnesota Act 350; Sarpy supra note 1, at 188.
Absent agreement of the parties, a written transcript of the proceedings
is unnecessary. Shapiro v. Gordon, 197 Misc. 241, 97 N.Y.S.2d 644
(Sup. Ct. 1949), modified on other grounds, 277 App. Div. 927, 98
N.Y.S.2d 451 (1950); A.O. Anderson Trading Co. v. Brimberg, 119
Misc. 784, 197 N.Y.S. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
18. See DoMvE 9; Horowitz, Guides for Resorting to Commercial
Arbitration, 8 PRAc. LAw. 67, 69 (Jan. 1962) [hereinafter cited as Horowitz, Guides]; Sarpy, supra note 1, at 189.
19. See AmRicCAN AsmmTrrnoN Ass'N, COMMERCIAL ABrIRATION
RULES § 50 (1959).

20. See Gantt v. Felipey Carlos Hurtado & Cia., 297 N.Y. 433, 79

N.E.2d 815 (1948); In re Doughboy Indus., 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 233
N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962); Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 App. Div. 2d 565,
180 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1958), affd, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d
541 (1959).
21. See Gantt v. Felipey Carlos Hurtado & Cia., 297 N.Y. 433, 79
N.E.2d 815 (1948); Staklinsld v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 App. Div. 2d 565,
180 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1958), afFd, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d
541 (1959); In re Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 38 Misc. 2d 423,
236 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
22. See Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer
Co., 20 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Pirsig, The Minnesota Act 349, n.60.
23. See also RESOLVING BusINEss DispuTEs 53-54.
24. The business reputation of a company or product may be
damaged by the very fact that a suit has been filed against them regardless of the outcome or merits of the suit. Arbitration prevents this
type of disclosure. See Sarpy, supra note 1, at 189. Disclosure of a
pending legal action may also imperil a party's credit rating. DOMKE
10. See RESOLVING BusNEss DIsPuTEs 53-54.
25. Court proceedings may require public disclosure of trade secrets and other production and management data which the businessman may feel should be kept secret. See DoaraE 10-11; RESOLVING
BusINss DisPuTEs 53.

26. Private proceedings combined with informal procedures help
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In addition to the aforesaid factors favoring arbitration,
Congress2 7 and a large number of states 28 have enacted statutes
attempting to further the use of commercial arbitration. These
statutes uniformly provide for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements and awards by the courts.29 Their primary purpose is to encourage arbitration and eliminate the necessity of resorting to court action to enforce awards. 30 Consequently, specific statutory provisions declare written arbitration agree32
ments irrevocable 31 and compel an unwilling party to arbitrate.
Arbitration is further encouraged by sections expediting review
of a party's claim that the arbitration is invalid 3 and provisions
authorizing the court to stay any action or proceeding in law or
at equity, subject to arbitration. 34 A party may proceed ex parte
and obtain a valid award after this proceeding if the other party
does not respond or appear after the notice of intention to arbibusinessmen to remain on good terms and to continue doing business
rather than creating antagonisms which might break these relationships.
See Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration, 40 HARv. L. REv. 929,
931 (1927); Schiffer, supra note 7, at 51; Note, Judicial Control 542;

Note, Judicial Review 681.

27. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
28. See, e.g., MVnmi.STAT. §§ 572.08-.30 (1965). For a list of arbitration statutes as of 1965 see Sarpy, supra note 1, at 191.
29. See, e.g., MNInN. STAT. § 572.08 (1965); DOMKE 18-19 (1965);
Pirsig, The Minnesota Act.
30. See Pirsig, Some Comments on Arbitration Legislation and the
Uniform Act, 10 VAmn. L. REv. 685, 685-86 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Pirsig, Some Comments]; Pirsig, The Minnesota Act 351.
31. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1964); MINK. STAT. § 572.08 (1965).
The signing of a contract containing an arbitration clause binds both
parties to arbitration, unless one party is able to raise one of the traditional contract defenses that exists in law or equity for the revocation of
any contract. See also Pirsig, The Minnesota Act 337; Note, Judicial
Control 521-22. However, breach of contract is not a ground that may
be asserted to avoid the arbitration clause. See Almacenes Fernandez,
S.A. v. Golodetz, 148 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1945); In re Pahlberg Petition,
131 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1942); Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 192). Once a court has determined that an agreement to arbitrate exists the merits of any dispute
arising under the agreement are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
arbitrator. Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 NT.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214
N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961); In re National Cash Register Co., 8 N.Y.2d 377, 171
N.E.2d 302, 208 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1960); Greene Steel & Wire Co. v. F.W.
Hartmann & Co., 235 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1962), affd mem., 20 App.
Div. 2d 683, 247 N.Y.S.2d 1008, appeal dismissed, 14 N.Y.2d 688, 198 N.E.
2d 914, 249 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1964).
32. See, e.g., AMN. STAT. § 572.09(a) (1965); Pirsig, The Minnesota Act 346.
33. See, e.g., Mm-Nw. STAT. § 572.09(a) (1965); Pirsig, The Minnesota Act 344-45.
34. See, e.g., M1uh. STAT. § 572.09(d) (1965).
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trate has been given.35 To avoid resort to the courts, statutory
sections provide for confirmation of an award by the court upon
the application of a party.36 Once the award is confirmed, a
3 7
judgment or decree will be entered in conformity therewith.
This judgment or decree will be enforced as any other judgment
38
or decree.
B.

FACTORS WEIGHING AGAINST ARBITRATION

In deciding whether or not to use arbitration, the businessman must also consider those factors unfavorable to its use as a
dispute settling mechanism. These factors include the unenforceability of agreements to arbitrate in many jurisdictions, inability
to predict results,39 unfamiliarity with its procedures, 40 and some
risks inherent in the nature of the arbitrator's decisional processes. Under the common law an agreement to arbitrate is unilaterally revocable until the award is granted.41 Therefore, although the decision of the arbitrator is final, enforcement of an
agreement to arbitrate, except by a suit for breach of contract,
is impossible under the common law rule 42 which is still in effect
in most states.43 This defect has been partially remedied by the
enactment in many states of arbitration statutes which contain
specific provisions providing for enforcement of agreements to
44
arbitrate.

An arbitrator is not required to follow substantive law,
35. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. § 572.12(a) (1965). This award can
be confirmed and a binding judgment entered upon it in the courts.
MAnm. STAT. § 572.21 (1965). Such a judgment, unlike a default judgment, is not subject to reopen. See Note, Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration, 53 GEo. L.J. 1079, 1085 n.41 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Judicial Supervision]. See also Kay, Default Judgments
Confirming Ex Parte Arbitration Awards-Sister State Enforcement,
15 U. MjAmm L. REV. 138 (1960).
36. See, e.g., MAUNN. STAT. § 572.18 (1965).
37. See, e.g., MNm. STAT. § 572.21 (1965).
38. Id.
39. See Note, Predictability of Result 1023-24.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109,
120-22 (1924); Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491, 496 (1858); Jalet,
supra note 1, at 524. Contra, Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School
Dist., 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475 (1941).
42. Gotshal, Foreward,10 VANu. L. REv. 649, 650 (1957).
43. See Sturges & Reckson, supra note 1, at 826-31. Nearly all
American jurisdictions have common law and statutory arbitration.
Id. at 826-31.
44. Prior to the enactment of the New York Act, statutes covering
arbitration provided only that agreements to arbitrate existing disputes were enforceable. Sturges & Reckson, supra note 1, at 822.
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either legislative or judicial, 45 but is free to decide the controversy according to his own interpretation of equity and justice.46 Furthermore, the arbitrator is not limited to legal or
equitable remedies or to the rules governing their use by a
court of law.4 7 The arbitrator's decision is final as to questions
of law and fact. 48 Therefore, case-to-case inconsistencies, errors
of judgment, 49 and misconstruction of contracts50 on the part of
the arbitrator are risks of arbitration and not subject to judicial
review.
Combined with the above factors is the businessman's
knowledge that one party may have an advantage over the other
due to his familiarity with arbitration and the availability to
him of previous arbitration awards which may have some precedential value. 51 While this disadvantage is not limited to arbitration, it is enhanced by the fact that arbitration records
are not generally available to parties who are not members of
the particular association. 52 This is particularly true in cases involving insurance, where the company probably has on file many
previous cases involving the policy or question in dispute while
the policyholder's lawyer will not have access to such material.5 3
The same problem exists in arbitration before trade associations to which the businessman does not belong. Furthermore,
the outsider suffers the additional handicap of being unable to
participate in the selection of the arbitrators, who are usually
picked from a panel selected by the trade association.5 4 All
45. See James Richardson & Sons v. W.E. Hedger Transp. Corp.,
98 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1938); Goodman v. Lazrus, 15 App. Div. 2d 530, 531,
222 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (1961); Note, Judicial Supervision 1102.
46. Baker v. Board of Edue., 13 Misc. 2d 922, 936, 176 N.Y.S.2d 360,
372 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
47. See, e.g., Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y.
2d 133, 163 N.E.2d 377, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960); Staklinski v. Pyramid
Elec. Co., 6 App. Div. 2d 565, 570-71, 180 N.Y.S.2d 20, 27-28 (1958),
aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959).
48. See, e.g., Bay Iron Works, Inc. v. Eisenstein, 17 App. Div. 2d
804, 232 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1962); Jalet, supra note 1, at 532-33.
49. See Shapiro v. Gordon, 197 Misc. 241, 97 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup.
Ct. 1949), modified on other grounds, 277 App. Div. 927, 98 N.Y.S.2d
451 (1950).
50. See Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. United Cas. Co.,
142.%F.2d
390 (1st Cir. 1944); The Hartbridge, 62 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1932).
51. Mentschikoff,
Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUm. L. REV. 846,
857 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration].
52. Isaacs, supra note 26, at 931.
53. While arbitration is supposed to handle each dispute individually, citation of previous awards may be persuasive. AzamicAx AnaiTRATION AssocIATIoN, NIN. WAYS To CUT ARBITRATION CosTs 2. See
Kronstein, Arbitration Is Power, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 661, 671 (1963).
54. See Kxonstein, supra note 53, at 614 n.11.
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these considerations combine to create a desire among businessmen for judicial resolution or review of many arbitrated
disputes.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION
A. PRE-ARniTRATIoN REVIEw

In reviewing motions to compel arbitration or to stay arbitration pending litigation, the courts have been confined by statuter, to reviewing only whether there is an agreement to arbitrate, 6 and, if so, whether the dispute is within that agreement.57 Court decisions on these issues are deemed necessary
under the theory that arbitration is a creature of the contract
and cannot exist outside of that agreement. 58 Traditionally, the
courts have decided these questions by using the criteria normally employed to determine the existence and validity of a contract. 0 Thus, the court will look to the contract in order to
determine if mutual assent is lacking. If the contract60 is void
for lack of mutuality, the arbitration tribunal is a nullity.
The court also determines whether the subject of the contract is prohibited by law,61 but if the objection is based on
public policy the arbitrator may be allowed to decide the issue. 2 However, the courts still retain the power to set aside
awards which violate public policy.68

In many jurisdictions

See, e.g., Mnm. STAT. § 572.08 (1965).
56. Pirsig, The Minnesota Act 346.
57. Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude,
45 CORNELL L.Q. 519, 531-32 (1960); Note, Judicial Control 532. Pirsig
feels that the court should not be allowed to decide the question of
whether the dispute is within the container contract since this in effect
allows the court to decide the entire dispute. Pirsig, The Minnesota
Act 346-47.
58. See Finsilver, Still & Moss v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y.
382, 390-91, 171 N.E. 579, 582 (1930); Jalet, supra note 57, at 526 n.42.
59. See Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 299,
55.

169 N.E. 386, 391 (1929).

60. See Kinoshita & Co. v. American Oceanic Corp., 287 F.2d 951,
953 (2d Cir. 1961); S.M. Wolff Co. v. Tulkoff, 9 N.Y.2d 356, 174 N.E.2d
478, 214 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1961).
61. See Durst v. Abrash, 22 App. Div. 2d 39, 253 N.Y.S.2d 351
(1964); Standardbred Owner Ass'n v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 31 Misc.
2d 474, 220 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
62. See Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Role of Public
Policy, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 545 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Role
of Public Policy]. See also authorities cited note 63 infra.
63. See, e.g., Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal. 2d 603, 204 P.2d 23
(1949); Franklin v. Nat. C. Goldston Agency, 33 Cal. 2d 628, 204 P.2d 37
(1949).

Both these cases involved disputes where one of parties failed

to obtain a license as required by law. The arbitrators decided in favor
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both the issue of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration contract

64

and the performance of a condition precedent are still

reserved for court decision. 5
Recently, however, some courts have shown a tendency to
surrender the decision of some of these pre-arbitration and
award matters to the arbitrator of the dispute.66 This has been
accomplished by the development of the separability theory
whereby the arbitration clause is separated from the container contract.67 If the arbitration clause has not been obtained by a fraud particular only to it, it is valid and the arbitrator may decide the issue of whether the container contract
was obtained by fraud.
The classic case illustrating this trend is Robert Lawrence
Company v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.,68 where the court held
that the parties under a general arbitration clause can agree
that the issue of fraud in the inducement as well as issues of
performance under the contract be decided by the arbitrator,6 9
although the parties may not allow the arbitrator to decide the
of the unlicensed party and the court vacated the awards on the
grounds that they violated public policy. However, it has been argued
that "public policy," since it is constantly changing, is too vague a
reason to allow a court to overrule an award. Meiners, Arbitration
Awards and "Public Policy," 17 ARB. J. (N.S.) 145 (1962). Courts also
ought to interfere when an award directs or allows the parties to depart from a law which operates notwithstanding a contrary consensual
arrangement. Cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications
Ass'n, 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949) (award vacated which allowed
a party to violate a penal law). However, courts do not always vacate
awards which arguably violate public policy. See, e.g., Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377, 202

N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960) (specific performance of a building contract);
Staklinsky v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d
541 (1959) (specific performance of a personal service contract). See

also Pirsig, The Minnesota Act 335.
64. See Moseley v. Electronics & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S.
167 (1963); Pirsig, The Minnesota Act 352.
65. See El Hoss Eng'r & Transp. Cc. v. American Independent Oil
Co., 289 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1961); Rosenbaum v. American Sur. Co., 11
N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667, 229 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1962).
66. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402
(2d Cir. 1959); Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn.,
266 Minn. 284, 123 N.W.2d 371 (1963); Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9
N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961). See also Pirsig,
Arbitrability Under the Uniform Act, 19 Bus. LAW. 763, 765-70 (1964).
67. The reasoning behind this theory is that the arbitration statutes are concerned only with arbitration provisions. Therefore, from
the scope of the statutes it is apparent 1hat the legislature wanted the
arbitration provision treated separately. Note, Judicial Control 524-32.
68. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
69. Id. at 410-11.
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issue of fraud in the inducement of the separate arbitration
clause.7 0 The Devonshire court reasoned that all doubts should
be resolved in favor of arbitration in order to fulfill the parties'
original intentions and to help ease the current congestion of
court calendars.7 1 In 1967 the United States Supreme Court, in
PrimaPaint Corporationv. Flood & Conklin ManufacturingCompany7 2 affirmed Devonshire's view of the judiciary's restricted
role prior to the arbitration proceedings.73
B.

PosT-ARITRATIoN REVIEw

With judicial control and review prior to arbitration thus
limited, the post-award review procedures become more important. 4 After the arbitrator has reached a decision he is required to draw up an award, sign it, and deliver a copy thereof
to each party.7 5 Upon receipt of the award, a party may
move in court for confirmation of the award which will be
granted unless the other party seasonably moves to modify,
correct, or vacate the award.7 6 The award will be modified or
corrected where miscalculation or mistaken description is obvious on the face of the award,7 7 or where the arbitrator has decided a matter not submitted to him and the correction may be
70. Id. at 411. The court reasoned that allowing the mere cry of
fraud in the inducement to avoid arbitration would frustrate "the very
purposes sought to be achieved by the agreement to arbitrate, i.e., a
speedy and relatively inexpensive trial before commercial specialists."
Id. at 410.
71. 271 F.2d at 410.
72. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Prima Paint was concerned mainly with
the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act to state contracts
involving interstate transactions. The Court held that the Federal Act
rather than the New York arbitration statute governed contracts involving interstate commerce. Id. at 402-07. For a discussion of the
applicability of Erie v. Thompkins to cases involving arbitration see
Note, Scope of the United States Arbitration Act in Commercial Arbitration: Problems in Federalism, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 468 (1963); Note,
Commercial Arbitration in Federal Courts, 20 VA~N. L. REv. 607 (1967).
73. 388 U.S. at 399-400, 402-04. The Court stated that the congressional purpose underlying the Act was to afford businessmen a speedy
method of dispute settlement which would avoid the delay and obstruction typical of court actions. 388 U.S. at 404. See also Dworkin, Arbitrations: An Obvious Solution to a Crowded Docket, 29 CLEVE. B. ASS'N
J. 167 (1958).
74. See Note, Judicial Supervision 1079. See also Note, Judicial
Review 683-90.
75. See, e.g., Mn . STAT. § 572.15 (1965).
76. See, e.g., MmNN. STAT. § 572.18 (1965); Pirsig, The Minnesota
Act 351.
77. See, e.g., MXNN. STAT. § 572.20 (1) (1) (1965). See also Comment,
When May an Arbitrator'sAward be Vacated?, 7 DEPAuL L. REv. 236,
239-40 (1958).
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made without affecting the merits of the decision on the issues
submitted.78
An award may be vacated when fraud, corruption, or other
undue means were used to procure it,79 when the arbitrator
was biased or engaged in misconduct prejudicing the rights of
any party, 80 or if the arbitrator exceeded his powers. 81 However, the practical problems of obtaining review are great. Usu82
ally the only writing required by statute is the award itself,
which is difficult to review since it is usually only a statement
of the amount awarded to the winning party. Bias is the
ground usually chosen for attack of the proceedings and the
award, but even here great leeway is allowed and few awards
are overturned. 83 This result is desirable, however, because
most of the benefits of arbitration axe lost when a party resorts
to the courts after arbitration. 84
IV. PROBLEMS ENGENDERED BY PRESENT LIMITS ON
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ARBITRATION
A.

SOCIETAL CONTROL VS. INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL

Commercial practices usually develop and change more rapidly than the laws which society has enacted to control and guide
business relationships.8 5 As a result the business community
has turned to the institution of arbitration to maintain the
78.

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 572.20 (1) (2) (1965).

79. See, e.g., Mnm. STAT. § 572.19(1) (1) (1965). See also Comment, supra note 77, at 240-42; see generally Rothstein, Vacation of
Awards for Fraud,Bias, Misconduct and Partiality,10 VAND. L. Rsv. 813
(1957).
80. See, e.g., MbNN. STAT. § 572.19(1) (2) (1965).
81. See, e.g., Miiii. STAT. § 572.19(1) (3) (1965).
82. See, e.g., MIfNN. STAT. § 572.15 (1965).
83. E.g., Nelly v. Mayor & City Council, 224 Md. 1, 166 A.2d 234

(1960) (arbitrator was an employee of one of the parties); Kronstein,

supra note 53, at 680.
Impartiality in arbitration can best be safeguarded by holding
over the proceedings the possibility of judicial review. Schmitthoff,
Arbitration: The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Courts, 1967 J. Bus.
L. 318, 325.
84. See Jalet, supra note 57, at 556; Note, Predictability of
Result 1023 n.10.
85. See Ellenbogen, English Arbitration Practice, 17 LAw & CoN[hereinafter cited as Ellenbogen, English
TEMP. PROB. 656, 657 (1952)
Practice]. The remedy should be to update the law, not bypass it, unless
it is to be completely bypassed. The xeconciliation of the law with
'present commercial practice is the basic problem in arbitration. Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 LAw & CONTEbw. PRoB. 631,
651 (1952).
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flexibility which it feels is necessary for its continued growth."6
Consequently, arbitration is used by some trade associations and
businesses to avoid judicial and legislative prohibitions, 87 thereby developing and implementing institutional interests instead
of those of the body politic. 88 It is currently recognized that
businessmen use arbitration to avoid possible legal difficulties
with the nature of the transaction involved; 89 to avoid governmental control of business; 90 to control the business ethics of
the participants; 91 to coerce, control, and discipline economically
weaker businessmen by using it to enforce unconscionable
contracts; 92 and to oppose the impact of laws, such as the antitrust statutes, designed to regulate or restrain business ac93
tivities.
Recent decisions allowing arbitrators to determine threshold
questions of legality have further increased this separation of
arbitration from societal control. It is evident from a review of
these cases 9 4 that arbitration has created a body of law separate
from that applied by the courts to govern commercial conduct. 95
The arbitration law is formulated only in relation to a particular
dispute or to the institutional interests of a particular trade
association with expediency and self-interest the only guides.0 6

86. See Ellenbogen, English Practice 657; Peck, Our Changing Law,
43 ComNELL L.Q. 27, 31 (1957). See also Dorvn= 1-4; Ellenbogen,
CommercialArbitration, 1 Bus. L.J. 247 (1954).
87. See Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration868.
88. See Carlston, supra note 85, at 651. This, of course, is a result
of institutional as opposed to individual arbitration. Herzog, Judicial
Review of Arbitration Proceeding:-A P-esent Need, 5 DEPAUn L. REV.

14, 31 (1955).
89. Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, lists this as one of the
four moving factors in choosing'arbitration. The others are (1) a desire
of privacy, (2) the availability of expert deciders, (3) the random
acceptance by many businessmen of the idea that arbitration is faster
and cheaper than litigation. Id. at 849.
90.

See DomxE 2; cf. Gotshal, Foreword, 10 VAmv. L. REv. 649

(1957). See also Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration 853-54.
91. Doxzv
2.
92. See Note, Judicial Supervision 1098-1101, and cases cited
therein. See also RESOLVING BuswnEss DIsPuTEs 62-65.
93. Kronstein, supra note 53, at 688-99; Note, Predictability of
Result 1025 nn.25 & 26.
94. See, e.g., Nelley v. Mayor & City Council, 224 Md. 1, 166 A.2d
234 (1960); In re Arbitration between Phillips & American Cas. Co.,
9 N.Y.2d 873, 175 N.E.2d 825, 216 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1961); In re Arbitration between Wainwright & Globe Indem. Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 971, 221
N.Y.S.2d 409 (1961), discussed in Kronstein, supra note 53, at 669-71.
95. See Kronstein, supra note 53, at 662; Herzog, supra note 88,
at 26-27.
96. See Carlston, supra note 85, at 649-51; Herzog, supra note 88, at
27-28.
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No attempt is made to weigh public policy or the other factors
considered by the courts or the legislatures when these institutions establish legal norms.9 7 However, this new body of "law"
has the same binding force as that enacted by legislatures and
formulated by the courts.98 Consequently, large and important areas of conduct are removed from judicial and legislative
control. 99 The existence of this phenomenon raises the question
of the wisdom of having law created by persons who are unresponsive and and unresponsible to society in general. The arbitrator, as lawmaker, is responsible primarily to the parties' 00 and
secondarily in some cases to the institution which has appointed
him to his office. 1° 1 From this position of power the arbitrator
is able to decide the particular despute with total unconcern
for public policy, established precedent, or even, ironically, trade
102
practice.
B.

UNP IcTABILrrY

The primary concern of most members of the business community is to avoid commercial disputes. 0 3 This can be done
only by structuring commercial practices so that they will infringe neither the accepted legal nor commercial norms. Trade
and business practices can be made to conform with these
norms only if the businessmen whose conduct is to be governed
know what the norms are. The problem with using arbitration
97. See Herzog, supra note 88, at 27-28; Note, Judicial Review 681.
It is clear that arbitration may affect society as a whole in a manner
that requires some attention by a decision maker who is responsible
to society in general. Jones, The Nature of the Courts "Jurisdiction"in
Statutory Arbitration Post-Award Motions, 46 CA=r. L. REv. 411, 413
(1958).
98. Kronstein, supra note 53, at 662. It has been argued that the
creation of an individualized body of norms governing behavior is an
inevitable result in any situation involv'mg institutionalized behavior.
Carlston, supra note 85, at 650. However, creation of these norms
does not imply or require that they be immune from regulation if they
conflict with those of society at large. See Cohn, Commercial Arbitration and the Rules of Law: A Comparative Study, 4 U. TORONTO L.J. 1

(1941).
99. Carlston, supra note 85, at 650; Kronstein, supra note 53, at 662.
Commercial arbitration plays its most significant role wherever there is
a system of law internal to two or more business institutions. It is
this system of law and relationships which is removed from the control
of society. See Carlston, supra, at 650 n.58.
100. See Note, The Role of Public Policy 547. See also Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration 866.
101. See also Kronstein, supranote 53, at 664.
102. See also Herzog, supranote 88, at 28.
103. See DomKE 1-4; RESOLVING BUSINEss DisPuTEs 13-14.
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as a method of determining commercial and legal norms is that
many times it is impossible for the businessman to predict or
determine the norms and sanctions governing his conduct'04 or
to structure his behavior to conform to the rules of conduct
which may be invoked against him. 0 5
This unpredictability is partly attributable to the character
of arbitration as a fact finding procedure in which experts apply
specialized knowledge of trade practices and goods to measure
performance under a contract, 06 rather than a method of determining what is or should be the legally established standard
of conduct in a given social-commercial context. Although arbitration may be more predictable than litigation as a fact finding
procedure since a trade expert rather than a "lay" judge or
jury decides the question, the net unpredictability is increased
in arbitration as a result of the lack of a requirement that the
107
arbitrator follow legal rules or any other type of precedent.
It is possible to write into the arbitration agreement the
requirement that arbitrators must decide all questions according to the law of the place of arbitration, or any other law, 08
but this leads to further complications since an arbitrator's award
may be reviewed by the courts and reversed if he attempts to
follow the law and fails. 0 9 The net result of this method of
review is to prolong dispute. Businessmen recognizing this
problem attempt to avoid arbitration where significant legal
issues are involved. 10
104. See Kronstein, supra note 53, at 662. See also Horowitz,
Guides 71-73.
105. See Kronstein, supra note 53, at 662.
106. Prima Paint Co. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395,
415 (Black, J., dissenting). Ellenbogen, English Practice 677-78.
107. See Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer
Co., 20 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515,
212 P.2d 233 (1949); Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. McCobe, 19
App. Div. 2d 349, 243 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1963); Canuso v. City of Philadelphia, 326 Pa. 302, 192 A. 133 (1937).
108. See Sturges, Arbitration-What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031,
1034 (1960); Herzog, supra note 88, at 17. See also W. STURGES, COMMERciAL ARBITRATIONS AND

AwARDs 793-96 (1930); Note, Judicial Review

688; Note, Substantive Law in Arbitration Proceedings, 12 U. FLA. L.
REV. 93 (1959).
109. See, e.g., Reid &Yeomans, Inc. v. Drug Store Employees Union,
29 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Comment, When May An Arbitrator's
Award Be Vacated, 7 DEPAUL L. REV. 236, 240 (1958). It is for this reason that the American Arbitration Association discourages written opinions. Note, Predictabilityof Result 1024 n.16.
110. This desire for more formalized and legally predictable proceedings is manifested in various ways, usually in cases involving large
sums. It has been shown that as the amount in controversy approaches
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C. ENCOURAGING DELAY AND RELATED PROBLEMS
The unpredictability of arbitration does not outweigh its
advantages when the parties decide upon the method of resolving a dispute after the controversy has arisen. In this situation, arbitration will probably be successful since the parties
are able to assure themselves that ;he dispute is one which is
suitable for decision by arbitration before they bind themselves
to arbitrate. It is important that both parties be satisfied that
arbitration is the best means to solve their particular problem
since any resort to the courts to compel or stay arbitration or to
modify or vacate an award will diminish some of the potential
benefits of arbitration."1 Moreover, the main argument favoring
judicial laissez faire with respect to arbitration has been that it is
112
a voluntary form of dispute settlement based upon a contract.
Although this argument assumes that a person may waive statutory and constitutional rights by contract, 11 3 it has greater weight
when the parties contract to arbitrate after the dispute has
arisen. Where the parties agree to arbitrate after the controversy
$20,000, the number of arbitration proceedings in which lawyers are
used to present the case increases to 100%. Mentschikoff, Commercial
Arbitration859 n.26. It may be inferred from this data that when large
amounts of money are involved the parties desire the relative predictability that accompanies a quasi-judicial interpretation of legal rights.
See Ellenbogen, English Practice 677-78.
Litigation may be preferable to arbitration in the following situations:
1. Cases involving difficult questions of law or fact where
pretrial procedures are likely to be of substantial assistance.
2. Cases where a decision according to law is wanted both
on the procedural level and on the merits level.
3. Cases where a jury trial is wanted.
4. Cases where the expense of arbitration substantially
exceeds the expense of court hearing, without compensating advantages.
5. Cases where appellate review of the applicable legal
principle is desired.
6. Cases in which special knowledge of arbitration is not
essential to obtaining a correct or equitable result.
7. Cases where proper procedural safeguards cannot be
obtained by agreement with respect to (a) the personnel of
arbitrators; (b) the right to rely on law and rules of evidence
or modification thereof; (c) the right to use pretrial techniques;
(d) the right to proper hearing dates with respect to the
hearing itself and the constituent parts thereof; (e) the right
to a decision in which the arbitrators make findings and give
their reasons.
RESOLVING BUSINESS DIsPUTEs 39-40.
111. Note, Predictabilityof Result 1023 n.10. See also Phillips, The
Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to a Voluntary
Proceeding,46 HThAv. L. REV. 1258, 1279 (1933).
112. Note, JudicialReview 682.
113. Carlston, supra note 85, at 631-32.
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has arisen, judicial review should be limited to the traditional
statutory grounds.1 1 4 The benefits of arbitration, win or lose,
would have already been deemed satisfactory by both parties,
who arbitrated knowing that the process is unpredictable and
that their legal rights might not be correctly enforced.
The judicial refusal to determine the legality of contracts
containing arbitration clauses has, however, made unpredictability of outcome more repugnant in those situations where the
contract calls for arbitration of all disputes arising under it.
The agreement to arbitrate may not be voluntary since unequal
bargaining strength or form contracts often result in one party's
involuntarily or unknowingly signing away his right to a court
Consequently, the key argument favoring judicial laistrial."1
sez faire with respect to arbitration is not as persuasive in
these cases, because it is not really a voluntary form of dispute
settlement.
However, because of limited judicial control in this area, a
dissatisfied party may resort to the courts only for delay. Thus,
a party who voluntarily signs such an agreement may engage
in delaying tactics if he feels that the dispute which arose
under the contract was not foreseeable and should be decided in
court on legal grounds rather than in arbitration on trade practice grounds. 16 Such a dissatisfied party may appeal to the
courts before arbitration claiming lack of arbitrability and
then invoke all possible delaying actions, appeal after the award,
and utilize other disruptive tactics. 1 7 The result is loss of the
advantages of arbitration along with the deprivation of legal
rights. A procedure is needed which will reverse this result and
still retain the advantages of arbitration while allowing a court
determination of the parties' legal rights.
114. See notes 75-84 supra and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Albrecht Chem. Co. v. Anderson Trading Corp., 298
N.Y. 437, 84 N.E.2d 625 (1949) (purchase orders sent by buyer provided
for arbitration); Tanenbaum Textile Co. v. Schlanger, 287 N.Y. 400, 40
N.E.2d 225 (1942) (arbitration provision stamped on an invoice ineffective). See also Note, Judicial Supervision 1099; Cohn, Commercial
Arbitration and the Rules of Law: A Comparative Study, 4 U. ToUnder the Uniform Commercial Code such an
RONTO L.J. 1, 25 (1941).
involuntary agreement is arguably not even a contract. See UxrnIORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 which allows the courts to refuse to enforce
unconscionable contracts. Many times the arbitration clause is not voluntarily agreed to because of a disparity in bargaining position between
the parties. Note, Judicial Supervision 1098-99.
116. RESOLVING BusINEss DisPuTEs 118-20.
117. See Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519, 556 (1960); Note, Judicial Control 542; Note,
The Role of Public Policy 546.
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Finally, arbitration is not being used as much as it could and
should be in many cases where it would be beneficial." 8 This is
often blamed upon lack of knowledge in the business community
of the availability and advantages of arbitration and upon the
hostility with which it is viewed by many lawyers." 9 Although
increased awareness in the business community might help to
spread the use of arbitration, its full potential will not be
reached until some method of obtaining greater predictability
is injected into its procedures. 20 Businessmen and lawyers
will not invest heavily in contracts when they are unable to determine what standards of conduct they must meet in order to
avoid monetary loss.
IV. PROPOSAL: THE SPECIAL CASE
Many of the objections to arbitration previously discussed
would be reduced by revising current arbitration statutes to
allow courts to resolve the legal questions involved. This
could be implemented by following the model of the English
Arbitration Act' 2' which provides ftat a "special case" can be
stated by either the arbitrator or the parties. 2- 2 The "special
118. Sarpy, Arbitration as a Means of Reducing Court Congestion,
41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 182, 184 (1965), suggests the use of arbitration to
handle auto cases in an attempt to clear court congestion. Id. at
182-84. The approach is worth exploring, but it points out the need for
more judicial-societal control of the resolution of disputes by arbitrators as more of society's conflicts are settled in this manner.
119. See RESOLVING BUSINESS DisPuTEs 42, 120-22.
120. Several other methods have been proposed to improve the arbitration process. One proposal would allow or require the arbitrator to
use the services of a lawyer for counsel on legal questions. Marks,
Shaky Foundation of Arbitration, 13 B. BuLL. N.Y. COUNTY LAW. AsS'N
206, 209 (1956). However, this overlooks the fact that many arbitrators
are lawyers. In addition, this procedure would not provide for a decision on issues involving society in general by a decision maker responsible to that society. It has also been proposed that arbitration
would be promoted by allowing the arbitrators to write opinions explaining and clarifying for lawyers the considerations the arbitrators feel
are relevant in making their award. Note, Predictability of Result
1033. It is probable that written awards would clarify those grounds
which are relevant in making awards and thereby aid predictability.
However, unless these awards are both reviewable and reversible the
growth of a separate body of law would be encouraged.
121. Arbitration Act of 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27.
122. Id. § 21.
(1) An arbitrator or umpire may, and shall if so directed by
the High Court, state(a) any question of law arising in the course of the reference; or
(b) an award or any part of an award, in the form of a
special case for the decision of the High Court.
(2) A special case with respect to an interim award or with
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case" allows the arbitrator to present any question of law arising
in the course of the reference or award or any part thereof in
the form of a special case to a court for decision. 123 1,
The special case must set out all the findings of fact necessary to enable the court not only to decide the point submitted
but also to decide whether those points arise and the manner
in which they originate.1 24 The arbitrator must state all facts
affirmatively; no alternative fact findings are permitted. Although questions of fact are not normally left to the court to
decide, 1 25 it may infer secondary facts from the primary findings
set out by the arbitrator. 26 Notwithstanding the requirement
that the arbitrator must formulate the fact findings to be submitted in a special case, he may insist that the party frame
the questions of law to be submitted. 27 The party also has the
obligation to ask the arbitrator to make findings on those facts
which are necessary for the court to determine the point of law
involved.128
It then becomes the arbitrator's obligation to
respect to a question of law arising in the course of the reference may be stated, or may be directed by the High Court to be
stated, notwithstanding that proceedings under the reference
are still pending.
See generally F. RUSSELL, THE LAV OF ARBITRATIoN 188-200 (17th ed. A.
Walton ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as F. RUSSELL].
The parties cannot validly agree not to apply for a special case.
See F. RussLi 190; Ellenbogen, English Practice 663. In Czarnikow v.
Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] 2 K.B. 478, the court ruled that a trade
association rule forbidding the parties to apply for the statement of a
special case was invalid as contrary to public policy.
123. Arbitration Act of 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27, § 21(1). The statement
of a special case can be required at any time during the proceedings.
In re Fischel & Co. v. Mann & Cook, [1919] 2 K.B. 431. See Ellenbogen,
English Practice 663-64.
124. Windsor Rural Dist. Council v. Otterway & Try Ld., [1954]
1 W.L.R. 1494 (Q.B.). This is necessary to avoid wasted effort on the
part of the judiciary.
[T]he court is not at the beck and call of the arbitrator to
answer whatever questions the arbitrator may want to put to
it, and it is not here to indulge in legal exercises. It is only
here to answer questions which it is satisfied do arise in the
course of the reference and are material to be determined....
Id. at 1497.
125. North & S.W. Junction Ry. v. Brentford Union, 13 App. Cas. 592
(1888).
126. Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noble Thorl G.m.b.H., [1960] 2 Q.B. 348,
373. Cf. Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v. Citati, [1957] 2 Q.B. 401,
427; Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v. Citati (No. 2), [1958] 2 Q.B.
254, 263.
127. Nello Simoni v. A/S M/S Straum, 83 Lloyd's List L.R. 157
(1949) (K.B.). This allows the arbitrator to state exactly the question
the party wants decided and thereby prevents the futility of deciding
unimportant questions.
128. F. RussEmL 195.
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formally present the question of law and findings of fact to the
12 9
court.

The parties may agree lawfully to have the award itself
stated in the form of a special case.13 0 Under this procedure
the arbitrator may state the award in the alternative. 131 An
alternative statement of the award allows the court to make its
decision and then affirm the proper alternative. This eliminates
the need to return the case to the arbitrator for further action.
If the parties have agreed prior to arbitration to have only the
award itself stated in the form of a special case, the arbitrator
may state the award as a special case and alternatively as a
final award. 132 If neither party petitions the court to hear the
special case, the award will become final without further action
by the arbitrator.
If the fact findings supporting the arbitrator's award are insufficient, the court has the power to remit the case to the
arbitrator. 13 3 The court may also set aside an award stated in
the form of a special case if the facts found are insufficient to
form a judgment on the law.1s4 For example, if the arbitrator
states that he is unable to determine facts on the issue of whether
or not a person has acted in accordance with prescribed legal
standards, the court will remand directing the arbitrator to make
129. F. RusSELL 191.
130. Arbitration Act of 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27, § 21(1) (b); see F.
RUSSELL 190 n.18.
131. See, e.g., Podar Trading Co. v. Tagher, [1949] 2 K.B. 277; The
Kyno, 63 Lloyd's List L.R. 43 (1939) (K.B.); F. RUSSELL 193-94; Schmitthoff, Arbitration: The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Courts, [1967]

J. Bus. L. 318, 324. For example, "the arbitrator will state that if the

question of law has to be answered this way, as in his view it should
be answered, he awards the applicant .£1,000 but, in the alternative,
if, contrary to his view, the question of law has to be answered the
other way, he dismisses the application." Schmitthoff, supra at 324.
132. See authorities cited note 131 supra.
133. Potato Marketing Bd. v. Merricks, [1958] 2 Q.B. 316, 336;
Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v. Citati, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 979, 986
(C.A.); F. RussELL 191. The court has the discretionary power to remit
all awards for further findings of fact. However, this discretion is
seldom exercised in final awards since prima facie the parties have
agreed to the arbitrator and therefore must accept his award as final.
In an award stated as a special case the award is not strictly final since
a question of law has been left for the decision of the court. Therefore,
the discretion to remit is more readily exercised in these cases. F.
RUSSELL 309.

134. This may be done on the grounds that the award contains an

error of law on its face or that it is impossible to answer the question
from the facts found. See J. Pattison & Co. v. Allied Nat'l Corp., [1953]
1 Lloyd's List L.R. 520 (Q.B.); Fratelli Schiavo di Gennaro v. Richard J.
Hall, Ltd., [1953] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 169 (Q.B.).
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an affirmative or negative fact finding.1 5
Unless the arbitration agreement contains a provision requiring the arbitrator to state a special case upon request of
the parties, he may refuse to do so. 136 The parties' only alternative in such a situation is to petition the court for an order
compelling the arbitrator to state a special case. 137 The court has
the sole discretion to deny or grant this order. This discretionary power of both the court and the arbitrator serves to prevent
clearly frivolous petitions for the statement of a special case
and its use as a mere delaying factor. However, since the
party has an additional opportunity in stating the award itself as
a special case, meritorious claims are not likely to be overlooked.
When a special case is stated and referred during the course
of arbitration, no appeal is allowed from the court's decision
without its leave or permission of the appellate court that has
jurisdiction over the matter. 38 Once a final award is stated as
a special case, however, an appeal lies without leave of the
court.139 This distinction is drawn because only the final award

is deemed ultimately to dispose of the rights of
Any decision of the court on a special case stated
award is viewed as an interlocutory order and
appealable since it is not determinative of the
41
rights

the parties. 40
before a final
therefore not
parties' final

135. F. RussELL 191, ex. 1.
136. Willers, Engel & Co. v. E. Nathan & Co., 30 Lloyd's List L.R. 208
(1928) (C.A.). If the arbitrator does refuse to state a case he must give
the party desiring the statement of a special case a reasonable opportunity to apply to the court for an order directing him to do so. Ellenbogen, English Practice 663. See Schmittoff, supra note 131, at 323.
137. Arbitration Act of 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27, § 21(1) (a); F. RussEL

195-96.

138. Arbitration Act of 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27, § 21(3); F. RussEL
197.
139. Several suggestions have been made for modification of the

special case procedure. One suggestion has been to adopt the procedure

of judicial arbitration. This would allow the parties to select a judge
as the arbitrator. It is suggested that this would allow retention of the
advantages of arbitration while giving added stature to the award and
allowing statement of a case by appeal directly to the Court of Appeals.
Schmitthoff, supra note 131, at 327. A second suggestion is to allow
statement of the special case directly to the Court of Appeals in order to
avoid delay in the lower court hearing. Id. at 327. A third proposal
would permit the parties to the arbitration to seek the jurisdiction of
amicable compositors, who would not be required to follow the law, but
could decide according to equitable concepts of fairness and justice.
However, the Court of Appeals would have authority to set aside an
award that it deemed unreasonable and render its own decision in the
case. Id. at 328.
140. F. RussELL 198.
141. Id.
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The most significant objection to present-day arbitration
procedure is its unpredictability. This unpredictability has led
142
some businessmen to distrust and therefore avoid arbitration.
Allowing the arbitrator to resolve legal questions has been one
of the largest causes of unpredictability. The special case removes this element of unpredictability by enabling a party to
obtain a judicial determination of legal questions arising during
the course of arbitration, thereby making legal standards heretofore ignored by arbitrators binding upon them. The capacity
to bind the arbitrator to standards which are ascertainable prior
to his decision enhances the bus"essman's ability to predict
the probable result of arbitration, thereby increasing his trust
and confidence in the process. In addition, the businessman will
be able to plan his future operations in order to comply with
the standard of conduct which he knows will be imposed on
him by the court through the arbitrator.
Adoption of the special case procedure would also attenuate
many of the abuses of societal norms resulting from institutionalized arbitration. For example, arbitrators will no longer
be able to decide legal questions while remaining completely
autonomous from statutes and judicial decisions governing commercial conduct. Any attempt by the arbitrator to substitute
his institutional bias for controlling legal precedent would be
counterbalanced by requiring him to apply for and follow a judicial determination in the form of a special case. As a consequence, formulation of commercial norms by arbitration will
adhere to those standards evolving from the legislatures and
the courts. 143 This development will enable and require businessmen to standardize their conduct to conform to uniform
societal norms rather than individualized trade norms. It will
also limit the arbitrator to his traditional role of determining
142. Lawyers choose the method of dispute resolution. One of
the main reasons for their animosity towards arbitration is the lack of
a judicial check on the arbitrator. See RFsOLviNG BusINss DISPUTES
115-20; Herzog, Judicial Review of Arbitration Proceedings-A Present
Need, 5 DEPAuL L. R.v. 14, 31 (1955). See also Dov!KE 14-16; Note,
Predictabilityof Result 1023.
The desirability of this type of procedure is shown by the popularity of "London" arbitration among many of the world's businessmen.
Cohn, supra note 115, at 31-32; Ellenbogen, English Practice 678; Ellenbogen, Commercial Arbitration, 1 Bus. L. REv. 247, 265 (1954); Schmitthoff, supra note 131, at 326.
143. The use of the special case in England is based partially on
the practical consideration of keeping the law uniform and avoiding
its being interpreted differently by various special tribunals. Czarnikow
& Co. v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] 2 K.B. 478. See Schmitthoff, supra
note 131, at 325.
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factual disputes of quality and quantity rather than his expanded present task of determining the "legal" obligations of the
members of a particular industry. Furthermore, the inability of
some parties to obtain copies of awards of precedential value or
to participate meaningfully in the selection of arbitrators by
an institution will become unimportant to the extent the significance of these factors is germane to any legal question arising in the dispute. Businessmen also hesitate to use arbitration because of the delay which can result from frequent resort to the courts in those cases where the delaying party is
attempting to obtain a judicial determination of his legal rights.
By using the special case a party may obtain such a judicial
determination within the framework of the arbitration procedure without disrupting the arbitration proceedings or casting discredit upon the arbitrator or the proceedings.
It is often objected that a more active judicial role in arbitration will remove many of the practical advantages associated with arbitration such as speed, economy, privacy, and maintenance of goodwill.144 As indicated above, however, the speed
of the process will be increased by the avoidance of delaying
tactics in cases where the judicial determination of legal rights
is desired. In other situations any delay would be relatively
minor since the special case would be heard as a motion
rather than at a de novo trial hearing. It is probable that
complete privacy will be lost to the parties, although the hearing of a special case would not be publicized as widely as would
a full trial on all the issues. Essentially the same observations may be made with respect to the maintenance of goodwill between the parties. Under the special case procedure, the
parties would probably tend to avoid sensation on legal issues,
thus approaching these questions more rationally than they
would under present procedures. Although arguments over
factual questions could still degenerate into emotionalism, overall goodwill between the parties would ostensibly be maintained
at a higher level than at present. Besides, little goodwill can
be maintained if one party feels that the other is attempting to
deprive him of a judicial determination of his legal rights and
to impose a unique standard of conduct upon him. The special
case procedure will help to maintain goodwill here by giving
this party an opportunity to have a judicial determination of his
rights. Arbitration may become less economical in some cases,
however, due to the slight increase in time spent in preparing
144. See Note, JudicialReview 681-82.
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and presenting the special case and the additional printing
costs required to present the special case and legal briefs to
the court. But this increase in cost must be balanced against the
present cost of delaying actions and appeals as well as the cost
of judicial proceedings in cases presently tried in court rather
than in arbitration due to the unpredictability of arbitration and
the accompanying desire for a judicial determination of legal
questions. The balance seemingly weighs heavily in favor of
the special case procedure.
It has further been objected that since the parties have voluntarily contracted for an extrajudicial decision of their disputes any judicial interference is an alteration of their contract and intent. 45 This is a valid objection where the parties
have voluntarily agreed to arbitrate after the dispute has arisen.
However, it ignores the fact that many contracts to arbitrate
future disputes may be imposed on a party through unequal bargaining strength, duress, or a form contract. 146

This objection

also ignores the fact that many parties voluntarily sign contracts containing arbitration clauses without foreseeing that any
disputes unsuitable to arbitration will arise.
It has also been argued that any method whereby the courts
would review questions of law creates complex problems of separating and dealing with mixed law-fact questions. 147 This argument is premised on the assumption that to allow the courts to
review awards under these circumstances will open up a whole
host of controversial questions to litigation and would defeat
some of the important advantages of arbitration. 148 However,
145. See id. at 682. See also Note, The Role of Public Policy 556.
146. See notes 115-117 supra and accompanying text.
147. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF Cobr1VIssIoNz-s ON Uir omw LAws,
PROCEEDINGS IN Coim fiEE OF THE WHOiE UNxroam AR~irTrAxoN ACT 74H
(August 13, 1954) (remarks of Maynard E. Pirsig).
148. Id. at 74H-75H. These remarks were made in response to
an objection to the lack of a provision allowing judicial review of arbitration awards on questions of law. Id. at 46H-4811, 49H-50H, 51H-52H.
See id. at 54H-55H. Some American statutes have provided a procedure
somewhat like the special case. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-415
(1958) allows the submission of questions of law to a court on the request of all parties if they agree in writing to be bound by the decision.
This procedure is probably too restrictive since it allows one party to
block a judicial determination of legal questions. Nevada, North Carolina, and Utah have enacted statutes based on the old Uniform Arbitration Act § 13. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 38.140 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-556 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31-13 (1953). Although it was
predicted that the availability of a referral provision would cause much
litigation, such has not been the case. See Sturges, Arbitration Under
the New North Carolina Arbitration Statute-The Uniform Arbitration
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this objection focuses only on judicial review of an award without a record of the arbitrator's specific factual conclusions.
The special case procedure requires the arbitrator to state the
facts upon which the question arises; it also requires the party
to state the legal question which is to be decided, thereby minimizing law-fact problems and avoiding a general review of the
proceedings.
The special case procedure will solve many of the predictability problems in arbitration but not all. The arbitrator
will still be able to color the fact findings and thereby foreclose
meaningful review of legal questions. In addition, entities frequently involved in arbitration will still be able to produce previous arbitration cases as precedent for factual determinations.
The problem of unequal bargaining power is also inherent in
arbitration, but its effect would be attenuated by allowing legal
questions to be referred to the court. These problems cannot
be completely resolved by the special case procedure, but must
be accepted as the small inherent risks of arbitration. In any
event, the special case procedure represents a significant step
toward solving many of the existing problems of arbitration, and the arbitration procedure can be greatly improved if
each state includes in its appropriate statute a clause providing
a procedure patterned after the special case example.

Act, 6 N.C.L. REv. 363, 407-08 (1928). The lack of cases under this procedure may be due to the fact that these statutes apply only to agreements to arbitrate made after the dispute arises and therefore any legal
questions will probably be taken directly to the courts.

